Social Science Journal ›› 2009 ›› Issue (3): 113-117.

Previous Articles     Next Articles

  

  • Online:2009-05-15 Published:2018-11-21

CLC Number: 

  • F202
〔1 〕Qian Yingyi, Enterprise Reform in China:Agency Problems and Polit ical Control. Economics of Transition ,1996 , 4 :427-447.
〔2 〕张维迎:《公有制经济中的委托人---代理人关系:理论分析和政策含义》, 《经济研究》1994 年第4 期.
〔3 〕Vickers, John,George Yarrow, "Economi c perspecti ves on privatizat ion, "Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 5, no. 2 (1991 ),pp . 111-132 .
〔4 〕Davis , Lance and North , Douglas ,Institutional Chang and American Economic Growth , Cambridge:Cambridge University Press ,1971.
〔5 〕Fraja and Delbono , "Game Theoreti c Models of Mixed Oligop -oly , " Journal of Economics Surveys , no. 4(1990 ), pp. 1-17 .
〔6 〕Fraja and Delbono , Alt ernative Strategies of a Publi c Enterprise in Oligopoly , Oxford Economi c Papers , vol. 41 , no. 2(1989 ), pp. 302-311.
〔7 〕Baumol, Business Behavior, Value and Growth, New York :Macmillan Publ ishing Company, 1959 .
〔8 〕林毅夫、刘培林:《自生能力与国企改革》, 《经济研究》2001 年第9 期.
〔9 〕陆铭:《为何改革没有提高国有企业的相对劳动生产率》,《经济学季刊》2003 年第2 期.
[1] . [J]. Social Science Journal, 2015, 0(3): 151-157.
[2] . [J]. Social Science Journal, 2013, 0(4): 47-50.
[3] . [J]. Social Science Journal, 2000, 0(2): 51-56.
[4] . [J]. Social Science Journal, 2019, 0(4): 155-160.
Viewed
Full text


Abstract

Cited

  Shared   
  Discussed   
No Suggested Reading articles found!