摘要： 演化经济学与博弈论并非是两种不可通约的研究范式,它们长期存在互动与交流。演化博弈论和主观博弈论在演化分析中的作用与局限显示,尽管随着博弈论的发展,经典博弈论的许多假设被放松,博弈论具有更多的演化性质,日益成为演化经济学重要的建模工具,但是,无论是演化博弈论还是主观博弈论都无法解释自身客观博弈形式的演化,博弈论还不能成为演化经济学的基本分析工具。而建构一个融合“变与不变”或“均衡与演化”的理论体系将是未来经济学的理论前沿。
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